The Commission for the Acceleration of Police Reforms is busying itself with tinkering with the institution, rather than putting right more substantive problems.
DEBATE within the Commission for the Acceleration of National Police (Polri) Reforms is still about institutional matters rather than more fundamental problems. The issue discussed is whether Polri should be placed under a particular ministry, come under the authority of a new ministry like a National Security Ministry, or remain as it is. This polemic is obscuring a more crucial problem: the very nature of police power.
Long before the commission was established by Prabowo Subianto in November 2025, Polri was suffering from fundamental problems. Since being separated from the Indonesian Military (TNI) following the 1998 Reformasi, the police had left the military structure. But this separation gave rise to a paradox. The Polri has developed into a very strong institution directly under the authority of the president, but with very little effective oversight.
The separation from the TNI was intended to demilitarize the police and encourage the professionalism of a civilian apparatus. Unfortunately, the reforms stopped at the structure and did not spread to the oversight system. With wide-ranging authority and a huge budget, but without adequate accountability, Polri transformed into a separate power within the state. This gave rise to its coercive nature, corrupt practices, and culture of impunity.
The Police Reform Acceleration Commission should have been established to put these matters right. The 1945 Constitution states that Polri is an instrument of the state tasked with maintaining security and order, upholding the law, and protecting as well as serving the people. Polri must not become an instrument of government power or any kind of political interest. Its loyalty is only to the state and its people.
However, the discussions within the commission have been trapped in the issue of tinkering with the structure. Those supporters of the establishment of the Security Ministry, for example, equate Polri with the TNI, which is under the Ministry of Defense. But this is a false equivalence. Police are not soldiers. The police work within the civilian realm, abiding by the principles of the rule of law, protecting people’s rights, and serving the public, not within the logic of military command.
In many democratic countries, the police are under civilian authority with strict oversight to ensure they remain independent from political interests. The problem is that the Indonesian context is different. Ministerial positions often become an arena for political compromise and the distribution of power. The placing of Polri under any ministry still carries the risk of political intervention.
If police reform is reduced to a mere debate over organizational charts, the agenda loses all meaning. The main issues of the police are unprofessional governance, abysmal accountability, a pervasive culture of violence, weak supervision, and a widening rift between the police and the public. Reform cannot stop at the shell, it must penetrate the core.
Substantive reform is increasingly urgent as the new Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP) expands police powers. Other investigators are now required to coordinate with Polri and cannot make arrests without an order from police investigators. Strengthening authority without strengthening control is a recipe for the abuse of power.
The problem is not just where Polri should be put in a structural sense, but how its power is checked. A democracy does not need a police force that is a titan before its citizens but a servant to those in power.
